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In 2010 an explosion in the Pike River mine in New Zealand 
killed 29 people, and, on the other side of the world, a 
blowout at the Macondo oil well killed 11 people and caused 
major environmental damage as four million barrels of oil 
spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. In 2005 a cloud of petrol 
vapour spread over two major motorways early on a Sunday 
morning after an explosion at the Buncefield storage depot  
in the South of England, which if it had happened at any 
other time could have caused significant loss of life. In 2008 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), one of the UK’s largest 
banks, was rescued from collapse by a government bail-out 
of £46bn, a contributor to and casualty of the global financial 
crisis. In the 1990s to early 2000s poor New Zealand building 
practices led to significant 
losses for home owners 
caused by leaky buildings. 
Estimates of the losses range 
to as high as $NZ11.3bn 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2009). 
These disastrous events from opposite 
sides of the globe seem to be disparate: 
some are systemic failures across an 
industry, others are single events; some 
are low-probability, high-impact events, 
others high-probability and low-impact 
if measured as the impact per individual 
affected at a single point in time, but 
high-impact if assessed on an aggregate 
basis across a number of individuals 
and a period of time. What they have in 
common is that they are all regulatory 
disasters: a catastrophic event or series 
of events which have significantly 
harmful impacts on the life, health or 
financial well-being of individuals or the 
environment, caused, at least in part, by 
a failure in the design and/or operation 
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Learning from Regulatory Disasters
of the regulatory regime put in place to 
prevent their occurrence. 
Regulatory disasters can be a particular 
form of policy disaster. Policy disasters 
have been defined as the disastrous 
unintended consequences which occur as 
the direct consequence of poor intentional 
choices by top political decision-makers 
(Dunleavy, 1995). Regulatory disasters 
may also be seen as a particularly acute 
form of a policy blunder. King and Crewe, 
for example, define a ‘policy blunder’ as: 
an episode in which a government 
adopts a particular course of action 
in order to achieve one or more 
objectives, and as a result largely or 
wholly of its own mistakes, either 
fails completely to achieve those 
objectives or does achieve them 
but at a totally disproportionate 
cost, or else does achieve them but 
contrives at the same time to cause 
a significant amount of ‘collateral 
damage’ in the form of unintended 
or undesired consequences. (King 
and Crewe, 2014, p.4) 
However, the scale of their 
consequences means that ‘regulatory 
disasters’ are more than just ‘policy 
blunders’. They include disasters caused 
by ‘judgement calls’ as well as poor design 
and implementation, and, as used here, 
‘regulatory disasters’ deliberately excludes 
‘political disasters’ – those that are 
disasters for the reputation or continued 
existence in power of the politicians 
or regulators involved. Many of the 
regulatory disasters focused on here are 
also political disasters, but a policy which 
is purely or mainly a disaster in political 
terms is not included. 
Regulatory disasters are also distinct 
from policy disasters in that they occur in 
a particular sub-field of public policy, and 
indeed need not be confined to the state 
at all: they result from the unintended 
and unforeseen consequences of the 
design and/or operation of a regulatory 
system and its interactions with other 
systems. As such, they can arise from 
poor decisions by politicians in the design 
of the regulatory regime and/or political 
influences on its operation, and/or poor 
decisions and practices by regulatory 
officials themselves within a system that 
may be either well or poorly designed. 
Regulation, or regulatory governance, is 
the organised attempt to manage risks or 
behaviour in order to achieve a publicly-
stated objective or set of objectives; 
a regulatory system consists of the 
(sometimes shifting) set of interrelated 
actors who are engaged in such attempts 
and their interactions with one another 
and the dynamic institutional and 
organisational environment in which they 
sit. Thus, regulatory disasters also differ 
from public service delivery disasters, 
as they do not involve the delivery of 
services to the public directly organised 
by a government department, agency or 
authority; or that are provided on behalf 
of, financed and regulated by government 
(contrast Dunleavy et al., 2010) unless 
those disasters arise at least in part from 
failures in the design and/or operation of 
the regulatory system to which that public 
service, such as a hospital, is subject. 
Regulatory disasters are horrendous 
for those affected by them. Because of that, 
we have an obligation to learn as much 
from them as we can, notwithstanding 
all the well-known challenges related to 
policy and organisational learning. For 
regulators, probing the reasons for the 
disaster, even if it occurred in another 
country, or in a different regulatory 
domain, can provide insights for the 
evaluation of their own systems. They 
can also provide useful leverage for 
persuading political overseers of the 
need for change. Regulatory systems 
can have a significant number of ‘latent’ 
failures which only become apparent 
on the occurrence of a particular major 
event, such as explosion or financial 
collapse, or through the recognition 
of an accumulation of a number of 
smaller events, such as individual 
deaths, smaller-scale pollution events or 
individual financial losses. These are the 
disasters ‘which are waiting to happen’. 
Other disasters were not foreseen, but 
neither may they have been reasonably 
foreseeable; or they involve ‘black swan’ 
events – what had been seen as low-
probability albeit high-impact events 
(Taleb, 2007). Nonetheless, the inquiries 
that often follow a disaster, even if it is a 
‘black swan’ event, often reveal systemic 
problems within the regime which have 
thus far gone unnoticed by regulators, or 
unheeded by key policy actors. 
Analysing the causes and nature of 
regulatory disasters also enables us to 
understand more about the nature of 
regulation itself. Although regulatory 
disasters often occur in apparently 
unrelated domains or countries, they can 
in fact contain lessons for all regulators, 
for the regulatory regimes share a 
common set of elements which, through 
their differential configuration and 
interaction, create the unique dynamics 
of that regime. In the regulatory disasters 
analysed here, these manifest themselves 
as six contributory causes, operating 
alone or together: 
•	 the	incentives	on	individuals	or	
groups;
•	 the	organisational	dynamics	of	
regulators and regulated operators 
and the complexity of the regulatory 
system;
•	 weaknesses,	ambiguities	and	
contradictions in the regulatory 
strategies adopted;
•	 misunderstandings	of	the	problem	
and the potential solutions;
•	 problems	with	communication	about	
the conduct expected, or conflicting 
messages;
•	 trust	and	accountability	structures.
The article focuses on five distinct 
and unrelated regulatory disasters: the 
construction of ‘leaky buildings’ in New 
Although regulatory disasters often 
occur in apparently unrelated domains 
or countries, they can in fact contain 
lessons for all regulators, ...
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Zealand in the late 1990s–2000s; the 
explosion at the Buncefield chemical 
plant in the UK in 2005; the events 
leading up to the bail-out of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland in 2008; the Macondo 
oil well blowout at the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010; and the Pike River mining tragedy 
in New Zealand, also in 2010.1 These are 
chosen because they are uncontroversial 
examples of regulatory disasters: events 
having significantly adverse impacts on 
human health, the financial position or 
the environment which arose from the 
design and operation of a regulatory 
regime intended to manage the very 
risks which materialised. They also have 
the advantage that each was subject to 
extensive investigation by an independent 
body established specifically to inquire 
into the causes of the disaster, so providing 
a wealth of factual information. While 
there are always inherent biases in any 
investigation, those which followed each 
of these disasters has not been significantly 
criticised as biased or ‘captured’ by any 
particular interest. 
The incentives on individuals or groups
In the aftermath of any disaster there 
are normally calls from politicians and 
the public for individual liability to be 
imposed; for some ‘heads to roll’. However, 
the role of individuals in causing or 
contributing to regulatory disasters is not 
straightforward. In some cases individuals 
may be a direct cause of a failure: for 
example, ‘rogue traders’ such as Nick 
Leeson, whose trading activities brought 
down Barings Bank in 1995. However, 
there is a complex interaction between 
individuals and the organisational context 
in which they are operating, which make 
separating out individual action difficult. 
In the regulatory disasters analysed here, 
individuals are often the proximate cause, 
but their actions are only an element 
in a series of interactions or events 
contributing to the disaster. 
In particular, the organisational 
context can produce conflicting incentives 
which affect individual behaviour. The 
Pike River report found that individuals 
in the workforce were operating in 
a context in which production was 
more important than safety (Royal 
Commission on the Pike River Coal 
Mine Tragedy, 2012 (hereafter Pike 
River report), p.12). Conflicts of interest 
can exist within regulators as well as 
regulated firms. In the case of Deepwater 
Horizon, regulators were responsible 
both for awarding licences for deep water 
drilling and collecting the associated 
royalties, and for ensuring safety and 
environmental protections. The drive for 
royalty income was such that a culture 
of revenue production dominated safety 
or environmental concerns, to the extent 
that some offices developed a practice of 
taking ‘benefits in kind’ instead of royalties, 
leading to serious charges of abuse of 
government authority and even criminal 
misconduct (National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling (2011) (hereafter 
Deepwater Horizon report), p.77).2 In 
addition, individual pay and reward 
schemes were linked to the speed with 
which officials issued licences, distorting 
balanced decision-making, particularly 
with respect to environmental impacts. 
(ibid., p.82). As many regulatory activities 
are performed through individuals, it is 
not surprising that the decisions, actions 
and inactions of individuals play a role 
in producing regulatory disasters. But 
to focus on individuals alone is to miss 
the significance of how their actions 
are governed by and interact with the 
broader organisational and institutional 
context in which they are situated.
Organisational dynamics, institutional 
context and system complexity 
Organisations are mechanisms which 
translate individual actions into collective 
action by enabling them to be sustained 
over time (Reed, 2003). The organisational 
systems, processes and dynamics of 
both regulators and regulated operators 
(regulatees) have played a significant 
role in all the regulatory disasters 
analysed here, as have the dynamics of 
the interrelationships between them. The 
internal dynamics of organisations are in 
turn affected by their broader institutional 
context. For firms this is usually the 
markets in which they are operating. 
For regulators it comprises principally 
their legal mandate and powers, their 
governance and accountability structures, 
the political context and their informal 
and formal relationships with other 
regulatory actors. 
That context can drive organisational 
dynamics and priorities in direct ways. 
In the case of Pike River, for example, 
the report found that while the ‘drive for 
production’ was a normal feature of coal 
mining, Pike River was in a particularly 
stressed economic situation as the 
company was in ‘start up’ mode: it had 
only one mine, which was producing 
far less than had been forecast, and it 
was seeking to gain market credibility in 
order to raise capital (Pike River report, 
p.12). In such circumstances, directors 
and executive managers paid insufficient 
attention to health and safety risks. The 
market context can also have a systemic 
effect across an industry, with significant 
implications for how a regulatory regime 
operates in practice. For example, in the 
case of New Zealand’s ‘leaky buildings’ 
disaster, the Hunn report found that skill 
levels in the building sector had been 
declining, and that the changing practices 
within the market meant that builders 
were no longer overseen by professionals, 
such as surveyors and architects, as they 
had been in the past (Hunn, 2002, p.9). 
For regulators, it is the political and 
legal context which has most bearing on 
... in the case of ... ‘leaky buildings’ 
disaster, the Hunn report found that ... 
the changing practices within the market 
meant that builders were no longer 
overseen by professionals .... 
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their organisational structures, processes 
and decision-making. Often the legal 
mandate and powers that regulators have 
is deficient in one or more ways. In the 
case of Pike River, the legal framework for 
health and safety regulation was criticised 
as too fragmented: those who issued 
licences to mine were not mandated to 
look at health and safety, so licences to 
mine were given without any scrutiny of 
health and safety. The regime may not 
include all of the risks that the activity 
poses: in the case of the Buncefield 
explosion, the report found that under 
the UK regulatory regime, societal risks 
(such as to the health and safety of those 
living in the vicinity of the site) were not 
taken into account in the land use and 
planning decisions made with respect to 
high-hazard sites. The legal mandate may 
also be such that it creates significant 
conflicts of interest for the regulator. 
In the case of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS) was responsible for licensing and 
collecting royalties and for environmental 
and health and safety regulation, and 
operated in a political context in which 
oil exploration, and preserving the 
royalties from that exploration, were the 
dominant concerns (Deepwater Horizon 
report, ch.3). Conflicting incentives and 
objectives in legal mandates often stem 
from the political compromises brokered 
between conflicting parties which 
are then embodied in the governing 
legislation. As the report to the president 
noted, ‘From birth, MMS had a built-in 
incentive to promote offshore drilling 
in sharp tension with its mandate to 
ensure safe drilling and environmental 
protection’ (ibid., p.56). Furthermore, 
governments themselves can have vested 
interests which conflict with other goals: 
it is a notable theme throughout the 
regulatory disasters arising from the 
extraction industry (mining, oil drilling) 
that the conflicts of interest created by 
the government’s interests in mining or 
drilling for natural resources can override 
its role in preserving the environment or 
making decisions about health and safety 
(Pike River report, vol.2, p.267; Deepwater 
Horizon report, p.72). 
Legislators also impose a business 
model on regulators through their 
decisions on funding. Those funded 
directly from government are prey to cuts 
in resources, which has an obvious impact 
on their ability to perform their role.3 
The report to the president on Deepwater 
Horizon concluded that the MMS had to 
pursue safety regulation on a ‘starvation 
diet’ due to Congress’s unwillingness to 
grant it appropriate resources (Deepwater 
Horizon report, p.72). In the case of 
Pike River, the government had reduced 
funding to the inspectorate and merged it 
with the broader Department of Labour. 
As a result, there were only two mining 
inspectors for the whole of New Zealand. 
But business models can be imposed in 
other ways. Both environmental and 
health and safety regulators in the UK, for 
example, are under a legal requirement 
to recover the costs of their inspections. 
The report into the Buncefield explosion 
found that the legal requirement to 
recover costs ‘can have an unwanted 
effect upon regulatory activities and the 
relationship between the [regulators] 
and duty-holders’ and ‘induce tensions 
in the relationship with site operators’ 
(Buncefield Major Incident Investigation 
Board, 2012 (hereafter Buncefield report), 
p.66).
Even where the legal mandate is clear 
and a regulator has a full range of powers, 
the political context and accountability 
structures can have a significant impact 
on how the regulator interprets it mandate 
and uses its powers. In the case of the 
MMS, it tried more than once to amend 
the regulatory provisions to introduce the 
requirement for a safety case and other 
reforms, but was continually blocked 
by industry, Congress and the Office of 
Management and Budget (Deepwater 
Horizon report, pp.71-3). In the case of 
leaky buildings, the Hunn report stated 
that: ‘Some territorial authorities and 
building certifiers hold the view that the 
certification process is constrained by 
a desire expressed by the BIA [Building 
Industry Authority] to building officials 
that any change to the process must 
avoid putting inflationary pressure on 
building costs.’ Overall, it concluded that 
political ‘influence may be compromising 
standards’ (Hunn report, p.19). In the UK, 
although the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) had a broad legal mandate and a 
wide set of powers to regulate banks and 
other financial institutions, the report into 
the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
found that the FSA had felt constrained 
from intervening too closely in RBS’s 
business model by politicians’ ambitions 
to preserve the City of London’s position 
as an international financial centre (FSA, 
2011, p.262). In the United States, royalty 
income from oil exploration was a highly 
lucrative source of revenue;4 in such a 
context, industry’s voice was allowed 
to frustrate attempts by the MMS to 
enhance regulation of their activities and 
the agency was never granted the political 
autonomy to resist them (Deepwater 
Horizon report, ch.3).
While the political and legal context 
has a role to play in shaping organisational 
processes, cultures and decision-making, 
a striking feature of all the regulatory 
disasters analysed here is the central role 
played by failures of governance and 
leadership within organisations, in both 
regulators and regulated firms. Critical are 
the skills and training of personnel, the 
resources of the organisation, weaknesses 
in leadership, and governance, including 
failures to manage risks strategically. 
Also striking are the consistent failures 
of organisations, particularly regulatory 
organisations, to coordinate in the 
operation of the regulatory system, 
... a striking feature of all the regulatory 
disasters analysed here is the central 
role played by failures of governance and 
leadership within organisations ... 
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failures which are exacerbated the more 
complex the system. 
With respect to internal failings of 
organisations, there are four central 
findings which are common to both 
regulators and regulated operators. 
First, and most obviously, culture 
matters. Organisations are internally 
complex and informal norms often 
dominate formal rules in the way 
activities are carried out and decisions 
are made. As a result, safety rules can be 
overridden when employees think they 
are unnecessary, as in Pike River (Pike 
River report, p.19). Or the culture drives 
decisions. In the case of the MMS, for 
example, environmental scientists within 
MMS stated that their managers believed 
that all environmental impact assessments 
should result in a ‘green light’ for drilling 
(Deepwater Horizon report, p.82). 
Secondly, the training, skills 
and expertise of personnel matters: 
organisations may simply lack people 
with appropriate expertise. This is a 
common feature in all the disasters, but 
it is notable that lack of training and 
expertise is often a more striking feature 
of regulators than it is of regulatees. This 
is frequently due to resources: disparities 
in pay between the regulator and industry, 
which makes recruitment difficult (see, 
for example, Pike River report, pp.29, 
vol.2, 274-5; FSA, 2011, p.24). However, 
it can also be because those at the top of 
the organisation do not value specialist 
expertise, as in the case of the MMS in the 
United States (Deepwater Horizon report, 
pp.77-8). Alternatively, organisations may 
have the expertise but those experts are 
not called upon to look at the appropriate 
problems, as in the case of the supervision 
of major hazard chemical sites in the UK, 
where environmental specialists were not 
called on at the appropriate times. The 
Buncefield investigation also found that 
experts from different disciplines can find 
it difficult to work together productively, 
and specialists may have little empathy or 
time for generalists, all of which can lead 
to conflicts over priorities and oversights 
(Buncefield report, p.30). In contrast, 
generalists may disregard the calls for 
resources made by specialists, as they 
cannot see the need for them. The impact 
this has depends on where the expert or 
generalist is within the organisation: one 
feature of Pike River was that the line 
managers were generalists and so did 
not understand how to inspect mines, 
even limiting the travel budgets of the 
inspectors to inspect mines in the North 
Island on the basis that the resources 
came out of the South Island budget 
(Pike River report,vol.2,  p.277). 
Thirdly, organisational failures usually 
come from the top. A central finding is the 
failure of leadership, in both regulators 
and regulated firms. For example, in the 
case of Pike River the investigation found 
that ‘The board did not provide effective 
health and safety leadership and protect 
the workforce from harm’ (Pike River 
report, p.18; see also Hutter, 2001). The 
necessary information simply was lost as 
issues moved up the organisation, and 
as a result the board could not assess 
or challenge assurances that had been 
given to it by management. An analysis 
of the failures of the boards of financial 
institutions in the wake of the financial 
crisis found exactly the same (Senior 
Supervisors Group, 2009; OECD, 2009). 
Boards can also be distracted: in the case 
of Pike River the board was distracted by 
the financial and production pressures 
that confronted the company; in the case 
of RBS, by the gains to be made from the 
activities it was pursuing. Regulators can 
be equally distracted: in the case of the 
FSA, the board had focused most of its 
attention on dealing with legacy issues 
from the previous regime, and on retail 
and insurance regulation. Analysis of 
board minutes for the years leading up 
to RBS’s rescue found that the board had 
devoted very little time to considering 
prudential regulation issues (FSA, 2011, 
p.266). In the case of Pike River, the 
absorption of the mining inspectorate 
into the generalist health and safety 
inspectorate, which was itself part of 
a much larger Department of Labour, 
meant that the department did not focus 
sufficiently on health and safety issues 
(Pike River report, p.29). 
Fourthly, organisations often take the 
path of least resistance, and as a result can 
fail to manage risks strategically. In the 
case of major hazard regulation (which 
for these purposes is taken to include 
financial supervision of systemically 
important banks), attention can focus 
more on the events that are ‘happening 
here and now’ than on risks that events 
‘may happen in the future’. The board 
report into the supervision of RBS 
found that the board focused more on 
legacy issues and retail mis-selling which 
demanded immediate attention, and as a 
result did not pay attention to prudential 
risks, which were seen to be remote. In 
the context of more traditional major 
hazard industries, the Buncefield report 
provided a useful reminder that 
Previous major incidents around 
the world such as Texas City, 
Longford (SE Australia) and Piper 
Alpha remind us that the task of 
controlling major hazard risks can 
become insidiously subverted by 
undue attention being paid to the 
less organisationally demanding 
issues of occupational safety. 
(recommendation 22) 
This is not a problem confined to 
regulators: in the case of both RBS 
and BP, neither focused adequately on 
high-impact, low-probability events 
(Deepwater Horizon report; FSA, 2011; 
and see House of Commons Energy and 
Climate Committee, 2010, para 33).
... inter-organisational failures between 
regulators can be as significant as internal 
failures in regulators and regulatees in 
contributing to regulatory disasters [as 
was] in the case of Pike River ...
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The complexity of the regulatory 
system can also be a key contributory 
element. In any regulatory system, 
multiple regulators will often have to 
interact, but for varying reasons fail to do 
so effectively, or even at all. As a result, 
inter-organisational failures between 
regulators can be as significant as internal 
failures in regulators and regulatees in 
contributing to regulatory disasters. For 
example, in the case of Pike River the 
investigation found that each regulator 
involved interpreted its mandate narrowly 
and did not share information with 
the other agencies involved (Pike River 
report, vol.2, p.268). In the case of leaky 
buildings, the Hunn report found that split 
responsibilities for approving building 
consents and issuing certificates led to 
confusion about roles, responsibilities 
and processes (Hunn report, p.23). In 
the case of Deepwater Horizon, the 
overlapping jurisdictions of the MMS 
and the United States Coastguard led to 
a requirement to continually renegotiate 
informal inter-agency agreements over 
an extended period and in effect expand 
the MMS’s jurisdiction, contributing to 
its under-resourcing (Deepwater Horizon 
report, p.76).
Furthermore, the different mandates 
of regulators may lead them to have 
differential priorities, which is a problem 
when they are meant to be jointly 
regulating the same site or activity, 
particularly where each is operating a risk-
based system for allocating inspection 
resources. For example, in the case of 
Buncefield, the site had a lower priority 
for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
than it did for the Environment Agency. 
As a result, the HSE was slow to complete 
its assessment of the site, delaying the 
ability of the environment regulator to 
ask the firm to address particular issues. 
Although there was a memorandum of 
understanding in place between the two 
regulators, there was ‘scant compliance’ 
with it. Software incompatibility inhibited 
data sharing, and communication was 
‘more a case of “copying in” colleagues in 
the other agency than proactive liaison’. 
Very commonly, there is also a lack of 
clarity about which agency has lead 
responsibility for which issues (Buncefield 
report, paras 55, 72, 99, 124-5).
Finally, failures in oversight can 
contribute to the difficulties of system 
management: regulators can be subject to 
performance or accountability measures 
which impose conflicting priorities on 
them, as with the MMS, or which are 
incapable of identifying weaknesses as 
the regulator lacks the expertise to do so, 
as in the case of Pike River, or does not 
see it as their role, as in the case of the 
Building Industry Authority.
Regulatory strategies and techniques
At the outset, regulatory disasters were 
differentiated from more general policy 
disasters as they involved the failure 
of a regulatory regime to manage the 
behaviour or risks the regime was created 
to manage in order to achieve a broadly-
defined goal or set of goals. A wide array 
of regulatory techniques can be used to 
achieve those goals, each with its own 
strengths and vulnerabilities. Each of the 
failures involved a different regulatory 
technique. In the case of Deepwater 
Horizon, regulation was highly prescriptive 
and expressed in legislation. Although the 
regulator had pressed Congress to revise 
the legislation to bring it up to date, this 
had not occurred. As a result, the deep-
water drilling techniques that the industry 
was using were in effect unregulated, 
as they were simply not covered by the 
relevant legislation (Deepwater Horizon 
report, pp.71, 75). In the aftermath of 
the disaster the US government agreed to 
adopt a system akin to that used in Norway 
and the UK, often referred to as ‘enforced 
self-regulation’ or management-based 
regulation. In such systems, the safety 
systems and processes are not prescribed 
in legislation; rather, the legislation sets an 
overall objective, such as ‘a safe system of 
work’, and the duty holder has to present its 
‘safety case’ to the regulator for approval, 
setting out how it proposes to achieve that 
objective. This system was introduced in 
the UK as a result of the Robens Report 
in 1972 (Robens, 1972), and forms the 
basis of New Zealand’s health and safety 
regulation.5 It was widely praised by the US 
commission investigating the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster as the best system to use, 
and has since been adopted there. The UK 
also reassured itself of the strength of the 
regime in a parliamentary review of the 
regulation of offshore drilling in the UK 
in the wake of Deepwater Horizon, set up 
to see what lessons, if any, could be learned 
from it for the UK (House of Commons 
Energy and Climate Change Committee, 
2010).
However, any strategy has an Achilles 
heel. One of the striking things about 
the regulatory failures relating to the 
supervision of banks and financial markets 
in the UK, and mines and buildings in 
New Zealand, is that each was an example, 
at least from a distance, of a textbook 
case of ‘new regulatory governance’ 
techniques (on the UK system see Black, 
2012). Management-based regulation was 
used in the case of both the regulation 
of the mining industry in New Zealand, 
and the regulation and supervision of 
RBS (and other banks) in the UK. In 
the case of New Zealand, however, the 
Pike River commission argued that in 
translating the UK system for health and 
safety regulation to the New Zealand 
context, New Zealand implemented a 
‘light’ version of the system which gave 
flexibility by focusing on the objectives 
to be achieved, but failed to supplement 
In the case of New Zealand ... the Pike 
River commission argued that in translating 
the UK system for health and safety 
regulation to the New Zealand context, 
New Zealand implemented a ‘light’ version 
of the system ...
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this with sufficient guidance or even 
prescription as to the minimum standards 
necessary, or sufficient engagement of the 
workforce in compiling the safety case 
(Pike River report, vol.2, p.252; see also 
Independent Taskforce on Workplace 
Health and Safety, 2013). Management-
based regulation works well where 
management’s incentives are sufficiently 
aligned with the regulators’ goals; 
however, as the FSA’s supervision of RBS 
showed, where they are not so aligned the 
technique is vulnerable to failure.
In the case of the building and mining 
industries, New Zealand also pulled back 
from prescribing products or processes in 
favour of setting performance standards, 
more often referred to in the UK context 
as ‘outcomes-focused’ regulation. This 
strategy involves removing a great deal of 
prescription from the rules, while setting 
overall goals to be achieved. The Pike 
River report found that in getting rid of 
those provisions, the regulatory system 
lost what might be termed its ‘institutional 
memory’. It commented: ‘The special 
rules and safeguards applicable to mining 
contained in the old law, based on many 
years of hard-won experience from past 
tragedies, were swept away by the new 
legislation, leaving mining operators 
and mining inspectors in limbo’ (Pike 
River report, p.32). Performance-based 
or outcomes-focused regulation places 
significant demands on both regulators’ 
and regulatees’ judgement and expertise. 
However, complex systems of detailed 
rules can be just as demanding to 
implement, and have the additional 
disadvantage of becoming easily 
outdated, as in the case of the regulatory 
regime for deep-water drilling in the US. 
These contrasting examples highlight the 
care that has to be taken in designing a 
rules-based system, to ensure that there 
is the right combination of principles or 
outcomes-focused norms and sufficient 
‘scaffolding’ through more detailed 
guidance provisions to indicate to firms 
how to comply and assure themselves 
and regulators that they have done so 
(Black, 2008).
A less commented-on regulatory 
technique, at least in the academic 
literature, is the art of monitoring and 
inspection. While there is considerable 
research on how to get regulated operators 
to comply with regulation, there is far less 
on how regulators can assure themselves, 
and others, that operators are or are 
not complying. However, a common 
feature across all the cases studied is poor 
monitoring strategies. In the case of Pike 
River, for example, inspections were on-
site, but did not involve wider audits of 
systems and processes, or assessments of 
the firm’s culture. In the case of RBS, in 
contrast, oversight focused too much on 
systems and processes and not enough 
on the business model. It was also partial, 
focusing on some areas of risk, mainly 
retail operations where there were known 
concerns, but not others, notably capital 
adequacy, where the risks were seen as 
more remote (and where the supervisors 
had less experience) (FSA, 2011, p.242). 
Similarly, in Buncefield, the regulators 
were criticised for focusing on known 
defects rather than taking a strategic review 
of all the control measures in place, and 
focusing on lagging rather than leading 
indicators. The report recommended 
that there should be a ‘clear line of sight’ 
between the inspection plans and the 
strategic outcome sought’ (Buncefield 
report, para 97, recommendation 6).
Knowledge, ideas and understandings 
Regulation is a problem-based activity: 
‘society’ in some form decides there 
is a problem, or that there is a risk of a 
problem in the future, and policy makers 
and regulators devise ways to address that 
problem. But how we identify something as 
a problem is contingent on what we value 
(and therefore what we think is under 
threat), and how we analyse problems and 
create solutions for them is contingent on 
our knowledge and understanding of the 
world and our ideas of how it operates. 
This applies to our understandings of 
regulatory disasters as it does to any other 
problem.
Knowledge, ideas and understandings 
are critical in the context of risk 
regulation. As noted above, operational 
drivers can be such that risks that are 
known but considered low-probability, 
albeit high-impact, are ignored, not 
because they are not known about but 
because a combination of assumptions 
about probabilities, understandings of 
impact and operational drivers means 
they are not prioritised for attention. 
More problematic, perhaps, are the 
risks which are not known about. Low 
risks, in particular, may escape attention 
both in the design of the regulatory regime 
or its operation because their cumulative 
impact is not known, or at least not 
recognised in that particular regulatory 
regime. For example, the Buncefield 
report found that the UK’s regime for 
major hazard regulation of chemical sites 
did not cover low risks which may have an 
incremental impact. Nor did it recognise 
societal risks, i.e. risks to those living near 
the site, as opposed to those working on 
it (ibid., paras 146-7). While the report 
recommended that planning decisions 
should take account of societal risk, and 
the HSE is working on technical guidance 
on the issue, the UK government has yet 
to introduce such a requirement.6 Some 
risks are just unknown, however. The 
explosion at Buncefield, for example, 
was a consequence of the ignition of a 
large cloud of vapour which was formed 
during the loss of petrol from a storage 
tank. The circumstances which led to the 
release of the vapour were predictable, but 
the consequences were not. The vapour 
release generated much higher pressures 
than would normally have been expected 
from a vapour cloud explosion, and 
exactly how or why the chemical reaction 
Low risks ... may escape attention both 
in the design of the regulatory regime or 
its operation because their cumulative 
impact is not known ... in that particular 
regulatory regime.
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occurred was still unknown at the end of 
the investigation (ibid., paras 19, 32, 51). 
Similarly, in the case of RBS, and indeed 
with respect to the global financial crisis 
more broadly, assumptions that had been 
made as to how markets would react in 
particular scenarios proved significantly 
misplaced, with risk events that had been 
anticipated to occur once in several lives 
of the universe occurring every day. In 
this case the causes were social rather 
than chemical, and it is a moot issue as to 
whether they could have been predicted 
had different modelling techniques, and 
a different understanding of markets, 
been used. Nonetheless, we cannot always 
manage uncertainty: we cannot always 
prevent disasters arising from risks that 
we know exist but about which we do not 
have full knowledge; nor can we manage 
risks that we do not know about at all. 
Communication and trust
Finally, the last elements of regulatory 
regimes which play a role in contributing 
to disasters lie in the communication and 
trust (or lack thereof) that exist between 
regulators themselves, and between 
regulators and those they regulate. Across 
the regime, different regulatory actors may 
send conflicting messages as to its goals. 
The Hunn report found, for example, 
that the foreword to the guidance on 
compliance with the Building Act stated 
that the aim of the act was to ‘minimise 
compliance costs’, but it was unclear 
whether this related to the administrative 
costs of compliance or to the overall cost 
of design and construction compliance 
(Hunn report, p.18). This is a particularly 
pertinent observation for the UK, which 
has recently introduced a requirement 
for non-economic regulators to take into 
account ‘economic growth’ in the exercise 
of their functions.7
Relationships with regulatees may also 
become over-trusting, though this is always 
a difficult issue to manage in practice. 
Regulators may have long-standing 
relationships with certain regulated 
firms, particularly large-scale operators 
who are geographically fixed (mining 
operators, in contrast to container ships, 
for example). Much research has found 
that regulators, either deliberately or less 
consciously, seek to build cooperative 
relationships with regulatees, and only to 
escalate enforcement action in response 
to the attitude of the regulatee and/
or the scale of the incident (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992). Although the US is 
often distinguished from other countries 
in this regard, it is worth noting that 
relationships between the MMS and the 
operators were also close, in some cases 
overly so (Deepwater Horizon report, 
p.77). In all the examples analysed here, 
the reports criticised the regulators for 
being insufficiently interrogative of the 
information given to them by firms, too 
slow to take action once problems were 
identified, or not having set out clearly 
when more formal action would be taken 
(Buncefield report, para 95; Hunn report, 
p.21). 
In the case of RBS, regulators were 
simply too trusting. From mid-2006 
onwards the FSA’s supervisors assessed 
firms against criteria relating to their 
management and controls, and whether 
they had dealt openly with the FSA. 
On the basis of these assessments it 
decided whether, and to what extent, 
a firm could benefit from a ‘regulatory 
dividend’. The Royal Bank of Scotland 
was given a regulatory dividend in 2006–
07, notwithstanding that relationships 
had in the past been highly fractious. 
In its report into the failure of RBS the 
review team declared that the concept of 
a regulatory dividend was ‘flawed’ and 
‘potentially dangerous’. It rewarded firms 
with less intensive supervision if they 
could demonstrate effective controls and 
displayed a degree of cooperation with 
the FSA ‘that ought to have been a non-
negotiable minimum’. It is worth noting 
that ‘trust’ may be resource-driven, 
however: the report also noted that the 
dividend may also have been awarded to 
enable supervisors to manage conflicting 
pressures with limited resources (FSA, 
2011, pp.257, 252). 
Regulatory dynamics and potential  
points of failure 
Although the analysis here examines each 
element in isolation, in reality each element 
interacts with the others to produce the 
unique dynamics of any regulatory regime. 
But while each disaster is in many ways 
distinct, there are some common sources 
of failure which are observable irrespective 
of the domain being regulated. In fact, the 
points of failure are depressingly familiar, 
and, most importantly, are common to 
both regulators and regulated operators. 
Within organisations these are most 
often inadequate training and skills of 
front-line staff; conflicting incentives, 
or incentives which conflict with the 
goals of the regulatory regime; and poor 
leadership and management oversight. 
In addition poor internal coordination 
and communication, for example 
between different types of experts, and 
weak coordination between the different 
regulators charged with managing the 
system are all too common. 
The disasters also illustrate the 
particular points of weakness of different 
regulatory techniques. For example, 
prescriptive regulation can quickly 
become outdated, but performance-based 
or outcomes-focused regimes require 
a supporting scaffolding of guidance. 
Management-based techniques need to 
ensure that the goals of the regulator 
really are embedded in firms. In industries 
characterised by low-probability, high-
impact events, they show that firms and 
regulators need to take care not to be 
Although the analysis here examines 
each element in isolation, in reality 
each element interacts with the others 
to produce the unique dynamics of any 
regulatory regime. 
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overly distracted with managing the high-
probability, low-impact events which are 
happening here and now. All the disasters 
also illustrate the need for consistent 
communication, and the importance, 
and difficulty, of managing trust within 
and of the regulatory regime as a whole. 
In sum, they illustrate that regulators 
have to be aware of and respond to 
limitations of the capacity and attitude 
of regulated firms; the weaknesses of 
their own organisational structures and 
processes; the pressures imposed by 
the market, legal and political context 
in which the regime is operating; the 
potential points of failure in the regulatory 
techniques being used; knowledge and 
understandings of risks and markets; 
the role of communication and trust 
throughout the regime; and changes 
in each of these (Baldwin and Black, 
2008). The analysis also suggests where 
those who oversee regulators should be 
looking for potential points of failure; 
and points to the varying ability that 
even independent regulators may possess 
to counter the pressures that politicians 
can place on them. But above all it shows 
that we need to learn from disasters, 
wherever they happen around the world. 
In doing so we will not prevent them 
from happening again, but we could 
reduce their likelihood.
1 Note that the lecture on which this article is based also 
included examples from the Mid-Staffordshire hospital 
inquiry in the UK, but this is omitted here for reasons of 
space. See Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Public Inquiry (2013) HC947.
2 For a full discussion of the regulatory environment see 
chapter 3.
3 See Deepwater Horizon report, chapter 3, for a discussion of 
the depletions of the MMS’s resources.
4 At the time the MMS was created royalties for oil drilling 
were the second highest source of revenues for the US 
government (Deepwater Horizon report, p.63).
5 See http://www.mbie.govt.nz/pdf-library/what-we-do/
workplace-health-and-safety-reform/effective-regulatory-
framework.pdf.
6 http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/societalrisk.htm.
7 Deregulation Bill 2014, clause 61.
Acknowledgements
This article was given as the Sir Frank 
Holmes Memorial Lecture in April 
2014 when the author was the Sir Frank 
Holmes Visiting Professor of Public Policy 
at Victoria University of Wellington. I am 
grateful to those attending the lecture and 
participating in subsequent discussions 
for their comments, and to Judy Kavanagh 
and Peter Mumford for their comments. 
All the usual responsibilities remain my 
own.
Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite (1992) Really Responsive Regulation, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Baldwin, R. and J. Black (2008) ‘Really responsive regulation’, Modern 
Law Review, 71 (1), pp.59-94 
Black, J. (2008) ‘Forms and paradoxes of principles based regulation’, 
Capital Markets Law Journal, 3 (4), available at http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/23103/1/WPS2008-13.pdf
Black, J. (2012) ‘Paradoxes and failures: “new governance” techniques 
and the financial crisis’, Modern Law Review, 75 (6), pp.1037-63
Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (2012) The Report 
of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board into the 
Policy and Procedures of the Health and Safety Executive’s and 
the Environment Agency’s role in regulating the activities on the 
Buncefield site under COMAH Regulations, London
Dunleavy, P. (1995) ‘Policy disasters: explaining the UK’s record’, Public 
Policy and Administration, 10 (2), pp.52-70
Dunleavy, P., J. Tinkler, C. Gilson and E. Towers (2010) ‘Understanding 
and preventing public service policy disasters’, LSE Public Policy 
Group, available at http://www.academia.edu/2871538/
FSA (2011) The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial 
Services Authority Board report, London: Financial Services Authority
House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (2010) UK 
Deepwater Drilling: implications of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, HC 
450-I, London: Stationery office
Hunn, D. (2002) Report of the Overview Group on the Weathertightness 
of Buildings to the Building Industry Authority, Wellington
Hutter, B. (2001) Regulation and Risk: occupational health and safety 
on the railways, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety (2013) Report of 
the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety in New 
Zealand, Wellington
King, A. and I. Crewe (2014) The Blunders of Our Governments, London: 
Oneworld
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling (2011) Deepwater: the gulf oil disaster and the future of 
offshore drilling, report to the president 
OECD (2009) Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: key 
findings and main messages, Paris: OECD
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) Weathertightness: estimating the 
cost, Wellington: Department of Building and Housing, http://www.
dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/News/WHRS/pdf/PWC-weathertightness-
estimating-cost-full-report.pdf
Reed, M. (2003) ‘The agency/structure dilemma in organization theory: 
open doors and brick walls’, in C. Knudsen and H. Tsoukas (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook on Organization Theory, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press
Robens, Lord (1972) Committee on Safety and Health at Work: report 
of the committee, London: Stationery Office
Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy (2012) Royal 
Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, volume 1, 
Wellington
Senior Supervisors Group (2008) Risk Management Lessons from the 
Global Banking Crisis of 2008 
Taleb, N. (2007), Black Swan: the impact of the highly improbable, 
London: Penguin
References
